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CASENOTE

MIRELES v. WACO: THE SUPREME COURT PRESCRIBES THE
BITTER PILL OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND SUMMARY
REVERSAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct are immune from suit....

The Court's ruling is not

justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary,is
not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and
does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions.
-

Justice William 0. Douglas"

This language opened Justice Douglas' stinging dissent in the 1967
United States Supreme Court decision of Pierson v. Ray, holding that
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act did not abolish the common law doctrine of judicial immunity.' Eleven years later, the Court expanded and
redefined the scope of the doctrine of judicial immunity in Stump v.
Sparkman. The Stump Court attached immunity to actions of a judicial
1. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-59 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 554-55. At the time of Pierson, § 1983 provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured to an action at law, suit in equity, or any other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1967). The Pierson decision did not hold that a judge is not a "person" for
the purposes of § 1983, nor that judges always are immune from a § 1983 suit. Rather,
Piersonheld that, because Congress did not specifically abolish judicial immunity when it
enacted the Civil Rights Act, a judge facing a § 1983 suit could still successfully raise such
an immunity. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55.
Thus, a judge will not be immune from § 1983 liability if he commits either a non-judicial
act or a judicial act in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1978).
3. 435 U.S. 349 (1978); see Irene Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833, 833 (1978) (opining that Stump. expands the immunity
doctrine); Peter H. Schuck, The Civil Liability of Judges in the United States, 37 AM. J.
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nature taken by a judge in his judicial capacity where such actions were
not taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. But rather than clarifying the doctrine of judicial immunity, the Stump decision generated confusion among courts4 and commentators" alike over what is proper jurisdiction and what is a judicial act under the judicial immunity doctrine.
CoMP. L. 655, 664 (1989) (stating that Stump provides a broad test for what constitutes a
judicial act); Jeffrey M. Shaman, JudicialImmunity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27
S.D. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1990) (stating that Stump delineates the factors relevant to a judicial
act); Jeanne F. Pucci, Note, Immunity Doctrines and Employment Decisions of Judges, 55
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 621, 622 (1987) (suggesting that Stump expands the definition of judicial act beyond its traditional context).
For historical background on the doctrine of judicial immunity, see generally J. Randolph
Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DuKE L.J. 879; Jay
M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REv. 201 (1980).
4. The confusion in lower courts is amply demonstrated by the experience of the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits. In Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 939 (1981), the Ninth Circuit held that a judge's "under the table" agreement to rule
favorably on a litigant's petition was not a judicial act. Id. at 847. The Rankin court reasoned that although the litigant dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity, the act was not
one normally performed by a judge. Id. Six years later, the court overturned Rankin in
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The Ashelman court pointed out
its mistake in Rankin: "[F]or purposes of applying immunity, we focused not on the judge's
ultimate acts which appeared to be judicial, but rather on the underlying agreement to conspire which Rankin declared to be nonjudicial." Id. at 1076. The Ashelman court also implicitly rejected the Rankin court's analysis of whether the judge had personal jurisdiction
over the plaintiff, stating: "As long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies." Id. at 1078.
The experience in the Eleventh Circuit is similar. In Dykes v. Hosemann, a three-judge
panel held that a judge was not immune from suit because he had not obtained the requisite
personal jurisdiction, although he had obtained subject matter jurisdiction. 743 F.2d 1488,
1497 (11th Cir. 1984) ("We conclude that a judge who acts in the clear and complete absence of personal jurisdiction loses his judicial immunity."). The panel also concluded that a
judge loses immunity only when the judge knows he is acting without jurisdiction. Id. (citing
Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1980)). In reversing the panel's decision on
rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit inferred that the Stump Court's jurisdiction analysis referred only to subject matter jurisdiction. Dykes, 776 F.2d 942, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (en banc) (citing to Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)), cert. denied
sub nom. Dykes v. Dykes, 479 U.S. 983 (1986). The court ruled that since the judge had
acted with subject matter jurisdiction, he did not lose judicial immunity. Id. at 949-50.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the four factors used by the Fifth Circuit in
identifying whether a judicial act had been performed. Id. at 945-46 (citing Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 858 (5th Cir.) (citatibn omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981). Thus,
both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits felt the need to adopt four "pre-Stump" factors even
after Stump supposedly refined the doctrine.
5. Under the Stump jurisdiction analysis, confusion does not revolve around the issue of
personal versus subject matter jurisdiction, since most commentators agree that Stump applies exclusively to subject matter jurisdiction. See Shaman, supra note 3, at 7. Instead,
criticism of the jurisdiction element in Stump focuses on the procedural flaws performed by
the judge. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 663 (stating that the jurisdictional element is satisfied in Stump even where judicial conduct "can only be described as extreme and outrageous"); Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 835, 836 (The jurisdictional limitation "is barely any
limitation at all. . . . Stump is a possible invitation to judicial lawlessness."). One commen-
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Then, last October, the Court simply added to the confusion with its decision in Mireles v. Waco, holding that a judge was immune from liability
for allegedly authorizing the police to use excessive force to hail an attorney into court.'
Howard Waco, a deputy public defender in Van Nuys, California, appeared in the Van Nuys Superior Court at 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1989.
The bailiff informed him that his client, charged with a parole violation,
had missed the jail bus and would not be present until 1:30 that afternoon. A few minutes later, two Los Angeles County police officers approached Waco in the hallway and told him that Judge Raymond Mireles
had requested Waco to appear before his court. Waco informed the officers that because his client was absent, he would be in Judge Alan Haber's courtroom addressing a7 procedural matter for another client who
was facing the death penalty.
Waco proceeded to Haber's courtroom. Meanwhile, Judge Mireles, angered that Waco had failed to appear, authorized the two officers to bring
him a "piece" or a "body part" of Waco.' Although Mireles may have
been joking,9 the police officers took his order seriously. 10 A Los Angeles
Times news report described the resulting scene:
tator has argued for the elimination of the jurisdiction analysis. See Block, supra note 3, at
921.
Criticism of the judicial act portion of the test has been widespread. See id. at 920 (arguing that Stump's brief legacy "has been disarray and dissatisfaction" because of its "inadvertent redefinition of the concept of judicial act"); see also Calvin T. Wilson, Judicial Immunity - To Be Or Not To Be, 25 How. L.J. 809, 816 (1982) (noting that the "divergent
opinions" of the Stump justices "as to the definition of 'judicial act' illustrate the existing
confusion as to the actual meaning of the term, and therefore, the exact scope and spectrum
of protected actions"); Pucci, supra note 3, at 631-33 & nn.73-80 (discussing the types of
problems courts and commentators have encountered in applying the Stump formulation of
judicial act).
The Stump judicial act formula has been criticized particularly in the context of judges'
employment decisions. See Pucci, supra note 3, at 621 (contending that employment decisions of judges are beyond the traditional context of judicial acts); Robert S. Glazier, Note,
An Argument Against Judicial Immunity for Employment Decisions, 11 NOVA L. REv.
1126, 1134 (1987) (stating that" 'Universal' rules may not be a realistic goal" in the employment context). In 1988, the United States Supreme Court removed the protection of judicial
immunity from employment decisions, characterizing them as "administrative acts." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988).
6. 112 S. Ct. 286, 289 (1991) (per curiam).
7. Patricia K. Lerner, A Peremptory Summons Leaves Court in an Uproar,L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1989, at B3. Since the case against Judge Mireles never went to trial, the facts have
not been judicially determined.
8. Id.
9. Two witnesses felt that Judge Mireles was joking. Id. Judge Mireles later told the reporter that he was only joking. Patricia Lerner, Judge Says Boycott Threat Unique, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at B3.

10. Lerner, supra note 7.
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As shocked courtroom personnel and spectators looked on, the two officers
grabbed Waco and pulled him from Haber's courtroom ...
The officers dragged the protesting public defender, still clutching his legal files, backward down the hall and into Mireles' courtroom. The officers
pushed Waco into the courtroom, causing a deputy district attorney to
scramble out of the way and Waco to suffer a bruised leg. ....
.1

The incident prompted Waco to sue Mireles and the two officers in
federal court under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.1 2 The district
court judge, citing the doctrine of judicial immunity, dismissed Waco's
suit against Mireles for failure to state a claim.' 3 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that if Mireles authorized the use
of excessive force, then he acted beyond his judicial capacity and was not
immune from suit." The Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision rendered without briefing and argument, reversed the court of appeals. 15
This Casenote addresses the Supreme Court's analysis and disposition
of Mireles v. Waco. Part II of the note considers whether dismissal of
Waco's claim was faithful to the policies underlying judicial immunity. 6
Part II also analyzes the Court's application of the judicial immunity test
and suggests that the Court either broadly applied the test or signifi-

11. Id.
12. Lawyer Sues Judge, Police for $400,000, UPI, Dec. 5, 1989, (available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPI file). Waco also sued the two officers. Id. By that time, Judge Haber had
decided not to hold the officers in contempt. Patricia K. Lerner, Judge Won't Cite Two
Who Dragged Off Attorney, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1989, at B3. The public defender's office
also threatened a boycott and unsuccessfully tried to get Judge Mireles removed from the
Van Nuys bench. Patricia K. Lerner, Public Defender Says Boycott Threat Unique, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at B3. In denying the removal, the presiding judge reassigned Judge
Mireles' criminal docket so that he would not hear cases involving the public defender's
office. Id. This action lasted nine months. Patricia K. Lerner, Public Defender's Office Lifts
First Boycott of Judge, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1990, at B3 (stating that the boycott ended in
early September 1990).
Soon after he filed suit, Waco was transferred against his will to the San Fernandino
public defender's office. Patricia K. Lerner, Controversial Public Defender Transferred
From Van Nuys Court, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989, at B3. Almost a year after the incident,
Judge Mireles was reassigned to a downtown Los Angeles criminal courts building. Patricia
K. Lerner, Once-Boycotted Judge to be Transferred, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1990, at B8.
13. See Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 216.
15. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 289 (per curiam), rev'g Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214 (9th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The case was decided during the interval between Justice Thurgood
Marshall's retirement from the Court and Justice Clarence Thomas' appointment to the
Court. Justice Stevens dissented on the merits of judicial immunity. Id. at 289-90 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy agreed, dissented on the disposition of the case by summary reversal. Id. at 290 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For the purposes of this Casenote, the Ninth Circuit's decision will be referred to as
Baltad, while the Supreme Court's decision will be referred to as Mireles.
16. See infra notes 20-54 and accompanying text.
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cantly altered it.'" Part III discusses how summary reversal of this case
affects the doctrine of judicial immunity.1 8 Finally, Part IV predicts the
precedential impact of the case. 9

II. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The doctrine of judicial immunity is not a defense to a particular cause
of action but a shield to protect judges from having to defend a suit at all.
It operates as an absolute shield for judges 0 only when they function in a
2
judicial capacity" and it applies only to suits for monetary damages. 2
While the official claiming immunity has the burden of proving that such
23
immunity applies, the doctrine is nevertheless broadly construed.
The doctrine is not abrogated upon allegations of malice toward a
party24 or conspiracy against a litigant. 25 Yet the immunity exists "not for
the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that judges should be at liberty to
exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of
'2 6

consequences.

17. See infra notes 55-105 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
20. Judicial immunity also applies: to administrative law judges and other executive officials acting quasi-judicially, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978); to prosecutors,
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); and to advocates and witnesses, Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Butz, 438
U.S. at 512).
21. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978). A judge will enjoy absolute legislative
immunity when he acts in a legislative capacity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980). Judges enjoy qualified immunity when
they act in an enforcement capacity, id. at 738, or an administrative capacity, Forrester,484
U.S. at 229-30; see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 664 (discussing qualified immunity of
judges). In distinguishing immunity doctrines, the Court focuses on "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Forrester,484 U.S. at 229.
22. Judicial immunity does not apply to injunctive and declaratory relief, or to attorney's
fees and costs. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-43 (1984). Nor does judicial immunity
insulate judges from criminal prosecutions. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1879);
see also Glazier, supra note 5, at 1132 (summarizing the law of judicial immunity).
23. See Forrester,484 U.S. at 224 (holding that the burden is on the official seeking immunity); id. at 225-26 (discussing the sweeping form of immunity enjoyed by judges, and its
extension to non-judges); see also Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (stating that a judge's jurisdiction
is construed broadly in context of immunity); Schuck, supra note 3, at 665 ("I have found
only a handful of lower federal court cases since Stump in which absolute judicial immunity
has been denied ...

and all involved allegations of extreme judicial misbehavior . .

").

But see Glazier, supra note 5, at 1141 (suggesting that courts do not agree whether immunity should be broadly construed).
24. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
25. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
26. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 349 n.I (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 219, 222
(1868)).
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A. Justifications for JudicialImmunity
In Forrester v. White,27 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cogently explained the justifications for the doctrine of judicial immunity:
The purposes served by judicial immunity from liability for damages have
been variously described ....
[T]he Court [has persistently] emphasized
that the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to
disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people
can have. . . . If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the
resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would
provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to
provoke such suits. . . . The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or
control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial
adjudication. Nor are suits against judges the only available means through
which litigants can protect themselves from the consequences of judicial error. Most judicial mistakes . . . are open to . . . [appellate] review, which
[is] largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with expos28
ing judges to personal liability.

As Justice O'Connor indicated, the purposes of the doctrine should not be
taken lightly. One commentator has persuasively argued that judicial immunity is very important to American society.29 Its significance arises
from the respect Americans have for the judiciary, and the immense responsibility that judges have "as the true guardians, oracles, and embodiments of the law. Their special province, conceded by all, is the protec' '3
tion of individual rights against public and private over-reaching. 0
Justice O'Connor's characterization of the doctrine underscores three of
the most significant purposes of judicial immunity: judicial indepen-

27. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
28. Id. at 226-27 (citations omitted); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 & n.4
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Edward G. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1937)). Justice Douglas argued that judicial immunity should extend only to acts that are "necessary to preserve an independent judiciary." Id. at 564. In a footnote, Justice Douglas explained:
Other justifications for the doctrine of absolute immunity have been advanced: (1)
preventing the threat of suit from influencing decision; (2) protecting judges from
liability for honest mistakes; (3) relieving judges of the time and expense of defending
suits; (4) removing an impediment to responsible men entering the judiciary; (5) necessity of finality; (6) appellate review is satisfactory remedy; (7) the judge's duty to
the public and not to the individual; (8) judicial self-protection; (9) separation of
powers.
Id. at 564 n.4 (citation omitted).
29. Schuck, supra note 3, at 658-60.
30. Id. at 659.
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dence, 31 freedom from vexatious litigation, 2 and the availability of alternate remedies. 3
Judicial independence, though exaggerated, is the most widely recogniied justification for retaining the doctrine of judicial immunity.3 4 In
Stump v. Sparkman, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine is essential to "the proper administration of justice" because it allows judges
"to be free to act upon [their] own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences." 5 In its purest form, this justification recognizes
the necessity that judges remain free from the political and pecuniary
pressures of the outside world.3
31. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 370 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that
the rationale underlying immunity "is the notion that private rights can be sacrificed in
some degree to the achievement of the greater public good deriving from a completely independent judiciary"). But cf. Shaman, supra note 3, at 3-4 (questioning whether absolute
immunity is necessary to protect, inter alia, judicial independence). See also infra notes 3436 & 49 and accompanying text.
32. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980) (contending that a judge should be able
to decide "the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted... with malice and
corruption"); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (stating that a judge "should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation"); Rene R. Gilliam, Comment, Judicial
Immunity - The Unworkability of the Current Test, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 553, 556
(1986) (citing Bradley 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351) ("[M]alicious or corrupt motives could
always be alleged, thereby subjecting judges to vexatious litigation."); see also infra notes
37-39 & 50-51 and accompanying text.
33. Stump, 435 U.S. at 369-70 (Stewart, J., and Powell, J., dissenting) (lamenting the
plaintiff's unavailability of appellate review); accord Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (stating that
only a judge's "errors [should] be corrected on appeal"); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at
668-71 (discussing the availability of judicial conduct boards, criminal prosecution, and impeachment for controlling judicial misconduct); see infra notes 40-48 & 52 and accompanying text.
34. See Shaman, supra note 3, at 4 (citing C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 970
(1986)) (stating that "the most important purpose of judicial immunity is to protect judicial
independence"); Schuck, supra note 3, at 659-60 (discussing the exaggerated, yet powerful,
perception of judicial independence).
35. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1871)). The notion of judicial independence caused Judge Phillip Roth to
protest vehemently against what he perceived to be a recent narrowing of the scope of immunity. Phillip J. Roth, The DangerousErosion of JudicialImmunity, 18 BRIEF 26 (Winter
1989). The judge points to several developments that have diminished the scope of judicial
immunity. The judge especially criticizes the increasing fluidity in characterizing judicial
acts and functions and the allowance of attorney's fees and injunctions. Id. at 29-31. According to Judge Roth, the danger of the present judicial immunity rule is that in "allow[ing]
inquiry into the judge's capacity. . . and mental state", a judge may "structure his or her
rulings to avoid being sued." Id. at 31. "This," he concludes, "constitutes the loss of judicial
independence." Id.
36. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 659 (citing Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:
PartisanGerrymanderingand the JudicialRegulation of Politics,87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325,
1377-84 (1987)) (noting the perception of "the judiciary as a citadel of principle under siege
by the forces of materialism and political 'pragmatism").
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The second justification of the judicial immunity doctrine, freedom
from vexatious litigation, is closely related to the first. Similar to the notion of independence, it insulates a judge from the honest mistakes he or
she may commit in the course of hearing a case.3 7 It provides that a judge
should be able to act without fear that another judge, in a collateral suit,
may find him or her liable for injuries resulting from "wrongly-decided"
or "procedurally-flawed" cases.38 A contrary policy allowing disgruntled
litigants to sue judges could result in massive and vexatious litigation and
could jeopardize the finality of judgments."
The third justification arises out of the first two. The doctrine encourages the use of mechanisms other than filing suit to correct judicial conduct. The availability of appellate review is the main safeguard that
counterbalances the shield of judicial immunity.40 Yet, the Court has
rarely invoked the absence of appellate review as a ground for denying
immunity.41 For instance, in Stump v. Sparkman,4 2 the impossibility of
redress through appeal did not preclude the Court from allowing judicial
immunity. Stump centered on a judge's ex parte permission to sterilize a
slightly retarded girl.43 The strong dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart
and Powell emphasized that the sterilized girl did not have the benefits of
appellate review available to her."
37. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 348 (1871)) ("Besides protecting the finality of judgments or discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks, the Bradley Court concluded judicial immunity also protected
judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled
litigants.").
38. See id. at 225 (asserting that "[jiudicial immunity apparently originated . . . as a
device for discouraging collateral attacks").
39. See Shaman, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that "[e]nsuring the finality of judgments
may be a valid goal").
40. Judicial immunity developed alongside appellate review and largely helped to replace
amercements, or fines, against judges for false judgments. See Block, supra note 3, at 88187.
41. Even the ForresterCourt, which recognized the availability of appeal as an important
purpose for judicial immunity, did not accord any significance to the fact that the plaintiff,
who alleged that a judge wrongfully fired her, did not have the availability of appellate
review. Forrester,484 U.S. at 225-27. Instead, the Court held that the judge had no immunity for his employment decisions because such decisions were administrative in nature. Id.
at 229-30.
42. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
43. Id. at 351-53.
44. Justice Stewart had trouble squaring the case with Pierson: "Not one of the considerations thus summarized in the Pierson opinion was present here. There was no 'case,' controversial or otherwise. There were no litigants. There was and could be no appeal." Id. at
368-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Powell found the decision inconsistent with the policy of Bradley: "But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies ... the underlying assumption of the
Bradley doctrine is inoperable." Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, resort to other mechanisms, such as sanctioning by judicial conduct boards, prosecution for criminal misconduct, and impeachment, does not adequately justify judicial immunity. 5 The principal
problem with these alternate remedies is that while they punish judicial
misconduct they do not compensate the victims of misconduct. 6 Judicial
conduct boards have received wide criticism for their flaccid punitive effect.47 In addition, judges facing criminal charges and impeachment may
continue to sit on the bench. 48 Thus, the third justification exists as a
shield for immunity, not as a sword against immunity.
Trying to reconcile Mireles with these justifications proves difficult.
Certainly, the decision does not appear to further any of the justifications
for judicial immunity. Judge Mireles did not exercise the type of judgment reasonably attributed to an independent judiciary.49 In fact, he did
not render a judgment on a case before him. It is difficult, therefore, to
discern how Waco's charges threatened Mireles' judicial independence.
In a similar vein, Waco did not bring suit to cure any substantive or
prbcedural error that he felt the judge had committed. His suit merely
alleged that Judge Mireles had authorized two police officers to commit a
battery.50 The suit was neither vexatious nor brought by a disgruntled
litigant. It was a personal injury action brought by an injured person
against an alleged tortfeasor. Although the alleged tortfeasor happened to
be a judge, that status by itself should not have mandated immunity. 51
Finally, Waco did not have access to the appellate process to correct
Judge Mireles' alleged misconduct. And although the California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly rebuked Judge Mireles, 5' the rebuke did not compensate Waco for the injury that the judge allegedly
45. Accord Schuck, supra note 3, at 668-71 (discussing the pitfalls of existing regulatory
and penal approaches to judicial misconduct).

46. Id. at 668-70.
47. Id. at 669 (showing that these mechanisms serve little deterrent effect because rates of
investigative activity are low and the sanctions are weak).
48. Shaman, supra note 3, at 20 (citing United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)).
49. As Justice Stewart might have said, "[T]here was not even the pretext of principled
decision-making." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 369 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 287 (1991) (per curiam).
51. Writing for the Forrestermajority, Justice O'Connor explained: "Here, as in other
contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by
the person to whom it attaches." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 219, 227 (1988) (emphasis
in original).
52. See Aaron Curtiss, Judge Rebuked for Courtroom Incident, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
1990, at B3. The Commission issued a statement explaining that "Judge Mireles had been
careless. . . by making remarks which he considered jocular but were capable of being, and
apparently were, misunderstood." Id. The Commission also stated that the judge's remark
"created in the officers the impression and belief that Judge Mireles had authorized their
use of physical force." Id.
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inflicted upon him. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision precluded Waco
from obtaining the only available redress from the judge's actions.
Conversely, one could argue that the Court's dismissal of Waco's claim
did not frustrate the doctrine of judicial immunity. 3 The proposition that
the decision undermined judicial independence, or that it would spur vexatious litigation against judges, would seem specious. Certainly, dismissing Waco's claim cannot be said to restrict a judge's independent decisional process. Nor would the dismissal likely produce a rush of claims
against judges. Moreover, the unavailability of redress does not usually
bar the application of judicial immunity.5 4 The real problem with the
case, if there is one, is the decision's apparent failure to be justified on
policy grounds alone.
B.

The Test for Judicial Immunity

The lack of public policy justifications in Mireles suggests that the Supreme Court either altered or broadly applied the current judicial immunity test 55 articulated in Stump v. Sparkman.5 6 Immunity applies where
the judge 1) performs a "judicial act" and 2) does not act "in the clear
'' 5 7
absence of all jurisdiction.
1.

Judicial Act

The first prong of the judicial immunity test requires that the action in
question be a "judicial act." The Stump decision identified two factors in
determining whether a particular act constitutes a judicial one: first, the
"nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and . . . [second,] the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."58
53. An argument could be made that the extension of judicial immunity in Mireles works
to detract from the public image of the judiciary as a whole. Cf. Block, supra note 3, at 880
(suggesting that "the most apparent effect of [Stump] has been. . . to call into question the
integrity of the judiciary and the judicial process"); see also Glazier, supra note 5, at 115152 ("It is important to recognize, however, that respect for the law may decline as people in
power are held to be immune from the laws.").
54. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
55. Of course, the assertion that policy does not justify the outcome of this case may also
suggest that the test itself is flawed, as some commentators have suggested. Feinman &
Cohen, supra note 3, at 256 (stating that the Stump analysis is unfaithful to policy concerns); Pucci, supra note 3, at 633 (remarking that the justifications for judicial immunity
are not a central concern in the Stump analysis).
56. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
57. Id. at 357.
58. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978), quoted in Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288
(emphasis in original).
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This characterization of a judicial act has been widely criticized.5 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Stump, stated that he thought the prong was
"legally unsound."60 Commentators have consistently supported the use
of different factors to determine whether an act is judicial." In fact, some
federal circuit courts use additional factors to determine whether an act is
judicial. 2 Two commentators have argued that the test should be applied
3
to specific, rather than general, characterizations of the facts.
The Mireles Court ignored these concerns when it analyzed the first
factor of the judicial act prong. Nevertheless, in analyzing the second factor, the Court properly concluded that Judge Mireles had acted in his
4
judicial capacity, and that Waco had dealt with the judge qua judge.
Looking, then, solely at the Court's analysis of whether the judge's act
was a normative function of judging illuminates the concerns that courts
and commentators have expressed regarding the judicial act prong and
the judicial immunity test as a whole.
The Court limited the facts alleged by Waco to a judge's mere authorization to hail an attorney before the court. Characterizing Judge Mireles'
action in this limited manner ignores the thrust of Waco's claim that the
authorization empowered the police officers to use excessive force. As a
result, the Court concluded that Judges Mireles had performed a judicial
act for which he was immune from liability. In doing so, the Court was
not wholly faithful to the precedent it cited in reaching its conclusion.
The Court had indicated in Stump that the first factor of the judicial
act prong focuses upon the function and the type of act performed by the
judge. The Court held that "Judge Stump was performing a 'function'
normally performed by judges and that he was taking 'the type of action'
59. See supra note 5.
60. Stump, 435 U.S. at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. The criticism mainly revolves around the absence of any consideration of a judge's
decisional discretion and judgment. See Pucci, supra note 3, at 631-32 & nn.73-74.
62. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits consider four factors:
whether: (1) the act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's court or chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case
then pending before the judge, and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.
Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396-97 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); see also
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Harris v. Deveaux, 780
F.2d 911, 914 (11th Cir. 1986); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nom., Dykes v. Dykes, 479 U.S. 983 (1986). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit did
not use these factors in deciding Baltad. See Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. The thrust of this argument is that judicial acts should be analyzed specifically rather
than looking to "normal" or "general" acts of judges as is done in legislative immunity analysis. See Robert F. Nagel, JudicialImmunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 237,
242-44 (1978); Gilliam, supra note 32, at 562.
64. Mireles, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288 (1991) (per curiam) (stating that "Waco. . .was dealing
with Judge Mireles in the judge's judicial capacity").
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judges normally perform." 5 In Mireles, the Court reformulated this factor: "[T]he relevant inquiry is the 'nature' and 'function' of the act, not
the 'act itself.' . . . In other words we look to the act's relation to a gen"66 Under the Mireles
eral function normally performed by a judge ....
formulation, subsequent courts addressing the judicial act prong must
perform the impossible task of analyzing the nature and function of the
act, while simultaneously ignoring the act alleged.
The Stump decision does not strongly support this proposition. In
Stump, the Court focused on the nature of the act, the function of the
act, and the act itself: "The Indiana law vested in Judge Stump the
power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization. He is,
therefore, . . . immune from damages even if his approval of the petition
was in error. '67 In other words, the Stump Court rested its ruling, in part,
upon the specific act that the plaintiff alleged - acting on and approving
a petition for sterilization.
The Stump Court also contrasted this alleged act with the act performed by the judge in Gregory v. Thompson.68 There, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a judge's removal of a litigant from his courtroom by force was "simply not an act of a judicial nature."6 "
In addition, the Supreme Court previously let stand the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Ammons v. Baldwin.70 The Ammons court held that a judge
did not retain immunity upon threatening a litigant with the use of
force.7 1 Thus, the Supreme Court undeniably looked, at least in part, to
the specific act alleged when it rendered its decision in Stump, expressed
its approval in Gregory, and denied certiorari in Ammons.
Moreover, squaring the Mireles decision with Gregory and Ammons
presents a formidable challenge since the Ninth Circuit principally relied
on these cases in deciding Waco v. Baltad.7 2 The Mireles formulation apparently would distinguish Gregory and Ammons by ignoring the act itself and by characterizing the act generally. The Mireles Court shrouds
its general characterization of the act in terms of the act's function, "the
function of directing police officers to bring counsel in a pending case
before the court. '73 The judges in Gregory and Ammons performed similar functions; yet the specific acts that they performed, the direct use and
65. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 n.11.
66. Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288-89 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
67. Stump, 435 U.S. at 364.
68. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); see Stump, 435 U.S. at 361 n.10.
69. Gregory, 500 F.2d at 64. The Ninth Circuit said that this act was "simply not an act
of a judicial nature." Id.
70. 705 F.2d 1445 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
71. Id. at 1448.
72. 934 F.2d 214, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1991).
73. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 289 (1991) (per curiam).
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threat of force, were precisely what caused those judges to lose immunity.
Thus, the acts in both Gregory and Ammons conceivably could receive
protection under the Mireles formulation. Alternatively, Gregory and
Ammons could be distinguished on the grounds that those judges directly
used or threatened force on a litigant, whereas Judge Mireles merely authorized the use of force on an attorney.
Briefly dissenting in Mireles, Justice Stevens also found problematic
the majority's over-generalization of the facts alleged by Waco. He divided Judge Mireles' action into two acts. The first act, hailing Waco
before the court, was an act to which immunity should attach.7 4 However,
Justice Stevens aptly stated that it was "undeniable that no immunity
5
would attach to" the judge's second act, "[o]rdering a battery.M
The Court's characterization of Judge Mireles' act is confusing in one
other way. The Court cited to Stump and Forresterfor the proposition
that an act is not less judicial because it is allegedly malicious or corrupt.7 6 The Court's reliance on Stump is misplaced since the Stump
77
Court asserted this proposition in its analysis of the jurisdiction prong.
Reliance on Forresteris also misplaced since that case did not address
the motive or intent of the judge's act. Rather, Forresterdealt solely with
whether the judge acted in an administrative or judicial capacity.78
Citation to Forrester is also misplaced because the Forresterdecision is
not relevant to the Mireles case. Forresterdealt exclusively with the second factor of the judicial act prong, the capacity of the judge and the
expectation of the parties.7 9 In contrast, Mireles dealt primarily with the
nature and function of the act, the first factor of the judicial act prong.8
Moreover, the proposition that an act is not less judicial because of a
judge's malicious or corrupt intention, is irrelevant to Waco's suit against
Mireles. Evidence of malice or corruption would be unnecessary to prove
Waco's allegation of battery under color of law. Therefore, the Court's
assertion of this proposition is problematic in three ways: Stump and
Forrester do not lend strong support to the proposition; the Forrest&
74. Id. at 289 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 288 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 S. Ct. 349, 356 (1978); Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)).
77. The Stump analysis had not yet reached the judicial act prong of the test. See
Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-60 (jurisdiction analysis); id. at 360-64 (judicial act analysis).
78. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219. 229 (188). In Forrester,the Court characterized a
judge's hiring and firing of employees as administrative in nature and held that judges enjoy
qualified administrative immunity for employment decisions, not absolute judicial immunity
for judicial acts. Id. Thus, the ForresterCourt addressed the judge's capacity to act, not the
judge's action.
79. Id.
80. Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288.
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decision is inapposite to the act-characterizing focus of Mireles; and the
proposition itself is irrelevant to the Mireles cause of action.
Although this Casenote's analysis could be considered hypersensitive,
nevertheless the precedential value of a summary reversal"' compels a
hard look into every nuance of the Court's per curiam opinion. Scrutinizing the Court's analysis of the judicial act prong reveals that the Mireles
majority struggled to explain clearly and cogently that prong of the judicial immunity test. As a result, the Mireles Court's analytical legacy is
both disconcerting and confusing.
2.

Jurisdiction

Under the second prong of the test, a judge "will be subject to liability
only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' "182 This
prong grew out of the common law doctrine in England that granted absolute immunity to judges in courts of general jurisdiction and granted
qualified, or partial, immunity for judges sitting in courts of limited jurisdiction. s3 However, in 1872, the Court's Bradley v. Fisher decision8 4 commenced a gradual erosion of the distinction between general and limited
jurisdiction.
In Bradley, the Court held that a judge sitting in a court of general
jurisdiction had absolute immunity for "judicial acts" taken "in excess of
jurisdiction," but not for acts taken "in absence of jurisdiction."8' 5 The
Court applied the Bradley absolute immunity rule 115 years later in Pierson v. Ray"8 where the judge sat in a court of limited jurisdiction. Thus,
by 1967, the Supreme Court ceased to recognize a distinction between
courts of general and courts of limited jurisdiction."
The Court further extended the Bradley rule in two significant ways in
1978. First, in Butz v. Economou, s the Court applied judicial immunity
to administrative law judges, thereby extending the jurisdictional element
beyond the courtroom and into the hearing room. And second, in Stump,
the fact that state law did not prohibit the judge from hearing the case
81. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)).
83. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 3, at 205-18; Block, supra note 3, at 892-96.
84. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); see Schuck, supra note 3, at 662-65.
85. Schuck, supra note 3, at 663; see also Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-53 (distinguishing between "excess of jurisdiction" and "clear absence of all jurisdiction"); Pucci,
supra note 3, at 625-26 (stating that the existence of subject matter jurisdiction alone satisfied the jurisdictional element in Bradley).
86. 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
87. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 663.
88. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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was sufficient to infer that the court did not act in the clear absence of
subject matter jurisdiction. 9
In Mireles, the Court briefly disposed of the jurisdiction issue in two
sentences.90 Analyzing these sentences separately demonstrates the curious contours of the jurisdiction prong. The first sentence states: "If Judge
Mireles authorized and ratified the police officers' use of excessive force,
he acted in excess of his authority."'" The principle that a judge can exceed his or her authority without acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction has been part of judicial immunity jurisprudence since Bradley.
In Bradley, the judge retained immunity where he acted in the presence of subject matter jurisdiction, even though he exceeded his jurisdiction.9 2 The Bradley holding emphasized that the validity of the errors
could be challenged on appeal or through other mechanisms.93 In Stump,
the judge retained immunity despite committing grave procedural errors,
since the errors did not interfere with the judge's authority to entertain a
mother's petition to sterilize her daughter."4 The Stump Court explained
that the jurisdiction question concerned whether authority over the sub95
ject matter existed, not whether that authority was properly exercised.
89. The Stump court stated: "[I]t is more significant that there was no Indiana statute
and no case law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction, from
considering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 358 (1978).
90. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 289 (1991) (per curiam). The lower level opinion by
the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the jurisdiction prong but rested its ruling solely on the
basis of whether Judge Mireles performed a "judicial act." Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214
(9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). On appeal, the Mireles Court, therefore, unnecessarily addressed the jurisdiction prong. Certainly, the Court could have remanded determination of
this prong to the Ninth Circuit. But because the Court opted not to remand the case, and
because summary reversals by per curiam opinions carry full weight in the lower federal
courts, the Court's jurisdiction analysis, though superfluous to its holding, deserves scrutiny.
91. Id.
92. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-53 (1871). The Bradley Court used an
example to demonstrate the distinction between acting in excess of jurisdiction and acting
without the existence of jurisdiction. A probate judge who tries criminal offenses acts without jurisdiction. But a criminal judge who imposes a penalty that is not allowed acts in
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the jurisdiction prong of the judicial immunity test is not satisfied in the case of the probate judge, but is satisfied in that of the criminal judge. Id. at 352.
93. Id. at 354. ("Against the consequences of their erroneous or irregular action, from
whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous'
remedies. .. ").
94. The Stump Court concluded: "Because the court over which Judge Stump presides is
one of general jurisdiction, neither the procedural errors he may have committed nor the
lack of a specific statute authorizing his approval of the petition in question rendered him
liable in damages for the consequences of his actions." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
359-60 (1978).
95. Id. at 359 (rejecting the lower court's conclusion that errors in procedural due process
are committed in the clear absence of jurisdiction); see also Block, supra note 3, at 914
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The same appears to hold true in the Mireles case. There, Judge
Mireles had the authority to try Waco's client. As such, the judge had
subject matter jurisdiction to hail Waco into court.96 The fact that Judge
Mireles allegedly authorized the use of excessive force (his exercise of authority) is irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry (the existence of authority). Whether or not Judge Mireles authorized force in hailing Waco into
court, he did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
The Court, however, confuses its jurisdiction analysis with the second
sentence: "But such an action - taken in the very aid of the judge's jurisdiction over a matter before him - cannot be said to have been taken
in the absence of jurisdiction. 9 7 One could interpret this characterization
of the facts as extending the jurisdiction analysis a step further than
Bradley and Stump. If Judge Mireles' act was taken in the aid of jurisdiction, it could not have been taken under color of jurisdiction' or
within jurisdiction. 9 Rather, the act may have been taken before jurisdiction was perfected.
Consequently, the result-oriented language of the second sentence is
confusing. On the one hand, the Court could mean that actions taken to
bring jurisdiction before a judge can confer jurisdiction over themselves,
if jurisdiction is eventually obtained. This would imply a subtle extension
of the judicial immunity doctrine which would protect a judge's actions
that result in jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Court could mean that
actions taken in the aid of jurisdiction are just another example of a
judge's improper exercise of authority. Interpreting the Court's analysis
in this manner demonstrates a very broad application of the judicial immunity test.
The most puzzling aspect of the Court's analysis of jurisdiction, however, is that it focuses on the act itself as an excessive exercise of authority. Yet, during its analysis of the judicial act prong of the test, the Court
minimizes Judge Mireles' act - the authorization of excessive force ("This argument, the Court recognized, confused the existence of authority with its proper
exercise.").
96. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991) (providing that a court has
the power "[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and
of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicialproceeding before it, in every
matter pertainingthereto") (emphasis added).
97. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 289 (1991) (per curiam).
98. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-53 (stating that immunity attaches even to acts
done in excess of jurisdiction if the judge or his court has de jure jurisdiction over the subject matter).
99. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 358 (agreeing with the district court that since the approval of
the petition was not prohibited by statute, it was included in the jurisdiction).
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and focuses instead on a judge's statutory power to bring an attorney
before the court - a statute conferring jurisdiction! 0 0
Thus, the Court confuses the analysis of the judicial immunity test in
three ways. First, it broadly construes, or perhaps slightly extends, the
jurisdiction analysis.'
Second, it focuses on the jurisdiction of Judge
Mireles in the judicial act portion of the test and focuses on the judicial
act in the jurisdiction prong of the test.'0 ' Third, throughout its judicial
act analysis, the Court fails to support its conclusions convincingly, and it
03
characterizes Judge Mireles' action generally.1
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court in Forrester,stated
that absolute judicial immunity is "strong medicine," justified only where
a great danger exists that officials will be deflected from "the effective
performance of their duties."'" She continues, "The danger here is not
enough. To conclude that because a judge acts within the scope of his
authority, such [actions]. . . are. . converted into 'judicial acts,' would
lift form above substance.' 10 5 Similarly, Judge Mireles acted within his
authority only to bring Waco before the court in a pending case. To assume that his authorization of force was thereby converted into a judicial
act also appears to lift form above substance.
III.

THE EFFECT OF SUMMARY REVERSAL

Justice O'Connor has also characterized the reversal of cases without
plenary consideration as "strong medicine."'0 8 According to Justice Marshall, "[s]ummary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this
Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are
not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error."' 7 Dissenting in
100. Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288. In the California Civil Procedure Code, Part 1 is entitled
"Of Courts of Justice." Title 1 of Part 1, entitled "Organization and Jurisdiction," contains
the relevant provision, section 128. Section 128, "Powers of Court," appears in Article 2,
"Incidental Powers and Duties of Courts," of Chapter 6, "General Provisions Respecting
Courts of Justice," of Title 1, Part 1. Section 128 therefore delineates the powers incidental
to jurisdiction of courts. On the other hand, Title 2 of Part 1 deals with "Judicial Officers,"
under which Chapters 2 ("Powers of Judges at Chambers") and 4 ("Incidental Powers and
Duties of Judicial Officers") seem more relevant to the judicial capacity factor of the judicial
act prong.
101. See supra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
104. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988) (quoting Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d
647, 660 (5th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
105. Id.
106. Dudley v. Stubbs, 489 U.S. 1034, 1039 (1989) (per curiam) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting).
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Mireles, Justice Scalia wrote, "The decision here reversed is, at a minimum, not clearly in error."10 8
Summary reversal by per curiam opinion is a summary disposition by
the Court on the merits of the case. 0 9 The Court simultaneously grants
certiorari, briefly decides the merits, and reverses the case below."10 When
the Court summarily reverses, the parties are not given the opportunity
to brief the Court on the merits or to argue orally before the Court."'
Summary reversal is but one of an arsenal of devices which the Court
2
uses to reduce its enormous caseload.1
Like other types of summary disposition, the Court does not give any
notice to the parties that the case will be summarily reversed,"' even
though Supreme Court Rule 16.1 warns that the Court possesses the authority to "summarily dispos[e] on the merits" any case after the parties
file the petition for certiorari and the brief in opposition."' This lack of
notice is particularly troublesome since the Justices themselves and commentators constantly "admonish[] the bar" that petitions for certiorari
and briefs in opposition should be kept concise. 1 5 In fact, Rules 14.4 and
15.3 state that these papers should be "as short as possible."' 6 The documents are intended only to set forth reasons why the Court should, or
should not, grant plenary consideration to the issues involved." 7 As one
commentator has noted, "In no event is either the petition or the opposing brief designed to be a brief on the merits."" 8
Justice Brennan has recognized that summary reversal may turn out to
be costly and time-consuming:
108. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286, 290 (1991) (per curiam) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
109. See ROBERT L. STERN,'ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 280 (BNA) (6th ed. 1986).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The Court may, inter alia, deny certiorari or summarily dispose. See id. at 239-46.
Besides summary reversals, summary dispositions include summary affirmances and summary reconsideration orders. When the Court summarily reverses or affirms, the Court may
issue per curiam opinions or memorandum decisions to explain its holding. See id. at 27787.
113. Id. at 280.
114. SuP. CT. R. 16.1, reprinted in ROBERT L. STERN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT RULES: THE
1990 REVISIONs 35-36 (BNA) (1990). Rule 16.1 provides: "After consideration of'the papers
distributed pursuant to Rule 15, the Court will enter an appropriate order. The order may
be a summary disposition on the merits." Id.
115. STERN, supra note 109, at 285.
116. Rule 14.4 provides: "The petition for writ of certiorari shall be as short as possible
and may not exceed the page limitations set out in Rule 33." See STERN, supra note 114.
Rule 15.3 provides: "A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and may not exceed
the page limitations set out in Rule 33." Id.
117. See SUP. CT. R. 14 (petition) & 15 (brief in opposition).
118. STERN, supra note 109, at 285; see United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458
U.S. 263, 271-72 (1982) (per curiam) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, an increased rate of summary [reversals] may prove to be
counterproductive. As the bar becomes alert to the increased probability of
summary [reversal], lawyers responding to a petition for certiorari will likely
choose to minimize the risk of summary disposition by. . . providing a full
statement of their argument on the merits. . . . [T]his will only "mean additional and unnecessary work for the lawyer, expense to the client, and
unessential reading matter for an already overburdened Court." 11 9
Summary reversal can, therefore, be viewed as a trade-off between the
problems attendant to a lack of notice to the parties and the necessity of
the Court to reduce its burdensome caseload. In this compromise, the latter consideration prevails.
This balancing act makes it difficult to discern when the Supreme
Court will consider a case "ripe" for summary reversal. 20 Per curiam
opinions rarely state the factors which contributed to the majority's decision to summarily reverse a particular case. 21 At best, one can infer these
factors from the dissenting olinions. 22 The inherent problem with this
type of analysis is that dissenting opinions voice only the reasons why
summary reversal should not be employed. Further difficulty may arise if
the individual opinions of the dissenting justices appear to conflict.
The Mireles case illustrates well the problems of summary reversal.
Justice Scalia's dissent adopts the more deferential view of summary reversal. Under this view, denial of certiorari should supplant summary reversal where the lower court's decision is not clearly erroneous, where the
facts are undisputed, and where the law is settled. 2 3 If this is the appropriate standard, then the majority in Mireles must have viewed the Ninth
Circuit's decision as clear error.
Another, more restrictive, school of thought would employ summary reversal only when the interests of justice so dictate. 24 This line of reasoning stems from the oft-quoted adage that the Court "is not, and never has
been, primarily concerned with the correction-of errors in lower court de119. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 387 n.6 (1982) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 365 (5th ed.
1978) and citing Ernest J. Brown, Forward: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 81-82
(1958)).
120. STERN, supra note 109, at 281 n.79.
121. Id. at 281.
122. Id.

123. Schweiker v. Hansen, 459 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Variations of the "clear error" theory appear in Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 51 (1982)
(per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and in Johnson v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 52,
54 (1982) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Stern, Gressman, and Shapiro have observed: "Apparently, then, the clearly erroneous decision correctable by summary reversal
should involve an error of greater magnitude than the mere technical, harmless, or parochial
error." STERN, supra note 109, at 282.
124. See Johnson, 457 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cisions. ''11 5 Thus, the reason for summary reversal must be found in Title
28, section 2106 of the United States Code, under which error correction
becomes part of the Court's power to reverse "as may be just under the
circumstances."I 26 If this is the proper summary reversal standard, then
the Mireles majority evidently perceived that justice required judicial immunity to insulate Judge Mireles' action.
A plethora of other protests levied against the employment of summary
reversal exist but do not appear to apply to Mireles.12 7 Nevertheless, the
effect of summary reversal in this case has implications far beyond Justice Stevens' difficulty in "articulat[ing] an acceptable theory of discretionary review that would explain" its disposition. 2 " The precedential impact of Mireles may depend largely upon which theory of summary
reversal the Court used to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision.
IV.

THE PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT OF MIRELES

As this Casenote suggests, the Mireles decision does not clearly indicate
whether the Court broadly applied the judicial immunity test or whether
the Court altered the test. Either explanation is plausible if coupled with
the proper theory of summary reversal. Before the Casenote embarks on
this "mating game," however, it is essential to determine how summary
reversal generally affects the precedential weight of an individual case.
A summary reversal is a decision on the merits of the case. 29 Therefore, unlike a denial of certiorari, it carries at least a modicum of precedential value.13 0 Case law teaches that summary affirmances and dismissals carry full weight with respect to lower courts, but little weight in the
Supreme Court itself.131 When a per curiam opinion accompanies summary dispositions, the Court has admitted that its decisions can be
"somewhat opaque. '111 2
125. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept.
7, 1949), quoted in Boag v. MacDougal, 454 U.S. 364, 368 (1982) (per curiam) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988).
127. See STERN, supra note 109, at 281-87.
128. Smith v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 667, 667 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing summary reversals in Mireles and Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991), with the
denial of certiorari in Smith).
129. STERN, supra note 109, at 280.
130. Id. at 242.
131. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (quoting Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d
537, 539, cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973)); see also STERN,
supra note 109, at 246-47 (discussing precedential value within the Supreme Court); id. at
247-52 (discussing precedential value in lower courts).
132. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973).

1992]

MIRELES V. WACO

Under the "clearly erroneous" theory of summary reversal, it is reasonable to assume that summary dispositions by per curiam opinions command more precedential weight than unexplained summary dispositions.133 It follows that if the Ninth Circuit below were clearly erroneous
in applying the judicial immunity doctrine, then the Mireles precedent
would be quite strong. If the Mireles precedent is indeed strong, and if
both the Ninth Circuit and Justice Stevens clearly erred, then one must
conclude that the Mireles Court altered the judicial immunity standard.
But, this result is not plausible. The Court would not be acting prudently
if it changed a federal common law doctrine through summary reversals
and per curiam opinions.
In contrast, utilizing the "interest of justice" theory, Justice William
Rehnquist stated in dissent to another per curiam opinion: "It cannot be
doubted that this case will have no importance beyond the facts and the
parties involved."' 34 Under this theory, the facts of the Mireles decision
become important in demarking its precedential effect. Yet, despite its
limitation to the facts, the effect should still be strong because summarily
disposed decisions receive full weight in the lower courts. This leads to
the conclusion that Mireles should be interpreted as an example of the
Court's preference to construe broadly allegations levied against a judge.
V.

CONCLUSION

The formulation, analysis, and disposition of the Mireles decision create more confusion than the case warrants. Justice Scalia was correct: the
Court should have decided this case, if at all, only after plenary consideration, or certiorari should have been denied, "since the factual situation it
present[ed] [was] so extraordinary that it [did] not warrant the expenditure of [the Court's] time."' '
If the clearly erroneous theory is correct, and the Mireles decision altered the judicial immunity test, the lower courts will undoubtedly struggle to apply the new standard. 3 6 The jurisdictional element would en133. Although summary dispositions without written opinions are inherently problematic
in that lower courts have difficulty discerning what the Court is affirming or reversing, they
carry some weight as precedent. STERN, supra note 109, at 249-52. Presumably, these same
dispositions, when clarified by a written opinion, should carry more weight.
134. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 368 (1982) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
135. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 290 (1991) (per curiam) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Justice Marshall had a similar fear with Tegard to summarily reversed cases:
Moreover, by deciding cases summarily, without benefit of oral argument and full
briefing, this court runs a great risk of rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions
that may confuse the lower courts: there is no reason to believe that this court is
immune from making mistakes, particularly under these kinds of circumstances.
Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 349 (1981) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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compass actions taken without jurisdiction, so long as jurisdiction over

the subject matter resulted from the action. The judicial act prong would
ignore the act itself, yet would look for a nexus between its nature and a
normative judicial function. As such, what the judge actually did would
be minimalized to the largest degree possible.
If the interest of justice theory applies, Mireles will be limited strictly
to its facts. Mireles then stands for the proposition that a judge retains
immunity even where the judge authorizes an act for which he could be
held liable had he committed the act himself.
In either case, if the scope of judicial immunity allows judges to authorize the use of excessive force to hail counsel before courts, as Waco alleged, then the test for judicial immunity is gravely flawed. Under the
Court's decision, the strong medicines of judicial immunity and summary
reversal become a bitter pill. As Justice Stewart stated, "A judge is not
free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he
announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity.""13 Often, Americans
perceive that there is
"an aura of deism which surrounds the bench ... [,] essential to the main-

tenance of respect for the judicial institution." Though the rhetoric may be
overblown, I do not quarrel with it. But if the aura there be, it is hardly
protected by exonerating from liability such lawless conduct as [allegedly]
took place here. And, if intimidation would serve to deter its recurrence,

that would surely be in the public interest.""8

Linwood I. Rogers

137. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
138. Id. at 369 (quoting the brief of the petitioner Judge Stump).

